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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 1) 
Jurisdiction agreed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 1) 
The parties differ only on phraseology of the issues, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 2) 
Issue joined. No new material. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 2) 
Issue joined. No new material. 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 2) 
1. The key facts now seem to be in agreement, although not 
whole-heartedly conceded by Defendant. 
2. This is a major change from Defendant's pleadings before 
the Trial Court (Plaintiff's original Brief Exhibits 2, 4 and 7), 
in which none of the key facts were conceded by Defendant. 
Reference in this Reply to Exhibits refer to that Brief. 
3. The key fact admissions are at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of 
Defendant's Statement of the Facts at page 3. 
4. At paragraph 3 Defendant says Plaintiff "alleges" her 
counsel was instructed by the Salt Lake County Commission to file 
a notice of claim with the Salt Lake County Attorney. Plaintiff 
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filed verified pleadings concerning these facts. (Exhibits 3, 6, 
and 8) Defendant states no differing facts. Defendant does not 
deny that allegation. As the facts are in Defendant's file, 
Plaintiff deems the allegation admitted for purposes of this 
appeal. Rules 8(d) and 56(d),(e), U.R.C.P. Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Company. , 746 P. 2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987). (If party on appeal 
does not state facts affirmatively, with cites to record, those 
facts are deemed admitted as verified by opposing party.) 
5. Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Statement of Facts (page 3) 
states similarly that Plaintiff's attorney "alleges" he spoke with 
Trish McDonald of the Salt Lake County Attorneys Office who 
directed him to file Plaintiff's claim with her, corroborating the 
advice given him by the County Commission. Now either Trish told 
Plaintiff's counsel to send the claim to her or she didn't. This 
is a simple specific fact known to Defendant. It would help if it 
said "yes" or "no", not "alleged." 
6. At paragraph 5, Defendant acknowledges that the Salt Lake 
County Attorney, acting as agent for the Salt Lake County 
Commission, negotiated Plaintiff's claim. 
7. Defendant's concession of negotiation is without caveat. 
The factual importance of that concession should be analyzed. 
8. Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's claim notice, is stamped by 
Defendant "Received, April 23, 1993, County Attorney Risk 
Management." This entity handles civil claims for the County. The 
County Attorney did not negotiate for itself. The claim was 
against the County, so it negotiated for the County. From this it 
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follows that if the County negotiated Plaintiff's claim, that the 
County accepted the claim as being properly served. 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(DEFENDANT'S BRIEF PAGE 5) 
Issues exist. 
The points of Defendant's Brief are answered in sequence as 
numbered by Defendant. 
Point 1. (Defendant's Brief page 5). 
Defendant claims Plaintiff expanded the facts of paragraphs 3 
and 4 of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts beyond those presented to 
the Trial Court. 
At paragraphs 3 and 4 of Plaintiff's Verified Answer to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Plaintiff's Brief, Ex. 3) these 
facts are specifically alleged under oath by Plaintiff's counsel. 
They were presented to the Trial Court. 
Point 2. (Defendant's Brief page 5). 
Defendant objects that paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts is a conclusion not supported by the record. 
Paragraph 5 is supported by the record. It is covered 
specifically in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Paragraphs 5-10. 
Point 3. (Defendant's Brief page 5). 
Defendant objects to the second and third sentences of 
paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. 
What is really important here is what Defendant concedes - the 
first sentence. 
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Defendant admits the first sentence which states that 
Plaintiff's counsel negotiated with the Salt Lake County Attorney. 
This is a major concession for the reasons pointed out, supra, page 
2 at paragraphs 5 - 7. 
Defendant contends Plaintiff's second sentence was not 
submitted to the Trial Court. 
These facts were specifically stated by Plaintiff to the Trial 
Court (Ex. 3, Paragraph 9). 
Plaintiff admits the third sentence of Plaintiff's paragraph 
6 is in error. The County does not dispute the fact that it did, 
during negotiations, pay for the damage to Plaintiff's vehicle. 
However, on reexamination of the record, this fact was not brought 
to the attention of the Trial Court by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff submits that, within its discretion, this Court 
should consider that fact as it is not in issue. Defendant has in 
its file Plaintiff's vehicle damage estimate and its cancelled 
check issued in May, 199 3, paying that damage in the sum of 
$680.00. This was Salt Lake County money paid in partial 
settlement of Plaintiff's claim. It verifies Plaintiff's 
contention that Defendant acknowledged her claim was properly 
served. Why else would it issue its check? 
Point 4. (Defendant's Brief page 6). 
Defendant objects to all of paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's 
Statement of Facts as not being presented to the Trial Court. 
Plaintiff disagrees. 
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The accident facts are covered in subparagraphs A and B 
(Plaintiff's Brief page 5). These are the same facts originally 
submitted to the County in Plaintiff's Notice of Claim (Exhibit 1). 
Plaintiff's claim letter (Exhibit 1) is the one piece of 
evidence absolutely not in issue. Defendant annexed it to its 
Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit 2). Does Defendant suggest only the 
addressee line, but not the content , was before the Trial Court? 
If there is a point here, it is that this objection illustrates 
Defendant's reticence. 
Plaintiff's subparagraph C (Plaintiff's Brief page 6), simply 
explains the facts and the negotiations covered in Plaintiff's 
paragraphs A and B. The same material is specifically covered in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, paragraph 9, page 3. 
Point 5. (Defendant's Brief page 6). 
Defendant objects to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts (Plaintiff's Brief page 6), that "the Salt Lake County 
Attorney not only knew the facts, it was a party to them," on the 
ground it "implies Defendant had a duty to admit the facts" to the 
Trial Court. Defendant denies it has such a duty. 
Please note the County Attorney does not deny the accuracy of 
the statement. It clearly was a party to the facts by its conduct. 
Plaintiff submits these facts are, on their face, adverse to 
the Counties position. 
The real question raised by Defendant is whether a party has 
a duty to advise the Courts of known facts adverse to its position? 
The answer is in the question. 
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Rule llf Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires candor of 
counsel with the Court at all times. Rule 11 does not give counsel 
the option of acknowledging only favorable facts. 
A denial of known facts also violates 78-51-26, Utah Code 
Annotated, "Duties of Attorneys and Counselors;ff 
"It is the duty of an Attorney and 
Counselor; (4) to employ for the 
purposes of maintaining the causes 
confided to him such means only as 
are consistent with truth, and never 
to seek to mislead the Judges by any 
artifice or false statement of fact 
or law." 
The statute makes the duty to admit, so as to avoid 
"misleading", a direct duty. 
This also comes within DR7-101 (3) and (5), stating a lawyer 
should not intentionally (3) conceal or knowingly fail to disclose 
that which it is required by law to reveal, and (5) knowingly make 
a false statement of law or fact. Again, the duty to admit is 
positive 
In sum, the County has a duty to the Court to admit known 
facts, even though adverse. 
Point 6. (Defendant's Brief page 6). 
Defendant objects to paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts. Its argument is that it was Plaintiff's duty to obtain a 
rebuttal affidavit from Ms. McDonald. 
There were two party conversations between Plaintiff's counsel 
and Ms. McDonald. Plaintiff's counsel has stated his version under 
oath. (Ex. 3, paragraphs 4,9. Ex. 6, page 4. Ex. 8, pages 1,2) 
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That is probative evidence. If the County Attorney wished to rebut 
Plaintiff's counsel's Affidavit, it needed Ms. McDonald. 
Plaintiff assumes no such Affidavit was submitted, because Ms. 
McDonald advised the County Attorney that she had put together a 
substantial file in this case based on her contacts with 
Plaintiff's counsel, that his statements were accurate, and she was 
not about to sign an Affidavit denying them. 
The above is speculation of course. However, the County 
Attorney's failure to produce Ms.McDonald's Affidavit is most 
probably explained on that basis than any other. Certainly, the 
County Attorney would have contacted Ms. McDonald about the matter. 
The absence of her denial affidavit is strong circumstantial 
evidence that she refused to give it. 
If Ms. McDonald was not available, she was succeeded in these 
negotiations by Colleen Cronin, an attorney on the County Attorneys 
staff. (Exhibit 3, paragraph 9, page 3) 
Ms. Cronin could have also filed an affidavit. She could have 
said she did not, as agent of the County, negotiate the claim. She 
too did not do so. 
It would seem that what happened here is that Defendant is 
trapped by its own tactics. 
It denied these contacts to the Trial Court. (Exhibits 2, 4, 
and 7) for the reasons, Plaintiff believes, stated above - they 
were adverse. 
So now, on appeal, the County Attorney can only try to shift 
to Plaintiff the responsibility for the Defendant's empty record. 
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Point 7. (Defendant's Brief page 7). 
Defendant objects to paragraphs 15 through 21 of Plaintiff's 
Statements of Facts. 
These deal with Plaintiff's claim that the County Attorney 
changed position. 
Plaintiff stands by these as appropriate. They explain the 
"why" of what happened. (Plaintiff's Brief, pages 8 and 9) 
They are indeed conclusionary as the County claims, but if the 
conclusions err, the County Attorney could specifically rebut them, 
and has not done so. 
Particularly, Plaintiff restates the last portion of her 
paragraph 21 in her original Brief which stated: 
"Certainly after Plaintiff filed her Answer (Exhibit 3) 
spelling out the facts, at that point the County had a duty to 
admit or deny them. Instead it simply ignored the facts in its 
later pleadings (Exhibit 4, 7). That was wrong. The facts are the 
facts. They may not treated as no-facts." 
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS 
Issue joined. 
Plaintiff stands on the Summary of Arguments submitted in her 
original Brief. 
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DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO, I. 
PLAINTIFF ADOPTED THE INCORRECT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO CONTROL THIS 
APPEAL. 
The issue is joined. 
Plaintiff stands on her statement of the standard of review as 
stated in her original Brief at page 10, point I. 
DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. II, 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE A PROPER 
NOTICE OF CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
The issue is joined. 
Defendant's Brief fails to state the issue clearly as it 
doesn't state the facts clearly. 
Plaintiff stands on her statement of this issue in her 
original Brief at page 11, Point II and here at pages 2 and 5 - 8 . 
Plaintiff submits two points to clarify. 
First, litigants have an obligation to present a matter as 
simple as this with good factual clarity to the reviewing Court. 
Here, the facts are not clear. 
Judge Frederick's two orders (Exhibits 5, and 9) don't state 
the facts he finds as proven on which he bases his Orders. 
His final Order, (Exhibit 9,) seems to imply that he views the 
issue as being one of law, and not fact, that the County Commission 
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must be served directly with a civil claim, or the claim service is 
fatally defective, regardless of circumstances. 
Confusion in a factual record on appeal aids the prevailing 
party. If the reviewing Court is uncertain as to the facts, it 
tends to rely on the Trial Court's view of the facts. 
The confusion arises because the facts are contested, rather 
than denied. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts is entitled to be accepted. 
The second point is one of definition. 
Plaintiff does not contend that the Salt Lake County 
Commission waived the statutory requirement of service of a claim 
on it. "Waiver" is not the issue. 
It is important to any large governmental entity to process a 
claim against it as soon as possible, because a prompt 
investigation gives it a better report on the facts than a deferred 
investigation. 
For the same reason, if a claimant thinks they have a strong 
liability case, they to want a prompt investigation so that 
negotiations can move from liability to damages. It was for these 
reasons that Plaintiff's counsel called the Salt Lake County 
Commission and asked if it had a preferred person to handle intake 
of civil claims. 
For the same reason it told him to send the claim direct to 
Trish McDonald because her job was exactly what both sides wanted -
she was the person designated to handle intake of all civil claims. 
Plaintiff's counsel immediately called Ms. McDonald. She 
confirmed the advice, told him to send the claim to her, and gave 
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her room number and address. Plaintiff's counsel simply 
readdressed the letter to her and mailed it the same day he spoke 
to her and the Commission, April 22, 1993, 
The next day, April 23, Trish McDonald received and signed for 
the letter and stamped it as received on that date by County 
Attorney Risk Management. 
In all of this there was no waiver on the part of the County 
in receiving the claim. It simply designated a procedure for its 
expeditious handling. 
Subsequent conduct, in which the claim was negotiated and 
partially settled without demur establishes that the County's 
designation of Ms. McDonald served for the County as it wished and 
directed. 
Finally there is nothing in evidence from the County 
Commission itself denying it referred the claim intake to Ms. 
McDonald, nor that it questions in anyway the validity of the 
service on it by Plaintiff to her. 
DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. Ill 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE 
INVOKED AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
Issue is joined. 
Plaintiff stands on her statement of this issue in her 
original Brief at page 17, Point III and here at pages 2 and 5 - 8 . 
The essential difference on this point in the Briefs is that 
Defendant seeks to escape acknowledging these facts. 
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Accordingly, Defendant's Brief fails to meet the law 
appropriate to them. 
The essence of the argument made by Plaintiff is that the 
County having negotiated, and even paid for Plaintiff's vehicle 
damage, without objection, certainly put Plaintiff in a position of 
reasonable reliance that the County accepted and was dealing with, 
her claim on its merits. It did so. That is a fact. 
For this reason, the County Attorney should simply have never 
filed a Motion to Dismiss. 
If it had intended to mislead the Plaintiff into a mistaken 
belief that the matters were being handled in good faith on both 
sides, in order to let the one-year statute of limitations run, and 
then claim improper notice, this would be unacceptable conduct by 
the County and particularly by its licensed attorney. 
Plaintiff doubts this occurred. She doesn't believe Ms. 
McDonald or Cronin would so deceive her. 
Equally, and this appears most likely from the County's Trial 
Court Pleadings, if a different member of the County Attorneys 
staff, after receiving the Plaintiff's Complaint decided then, for 
the first time to deny adequacy of service, the County then changed 
position by ignoring its own active participation, based on the 
facts known to it in its file. This too is unacceptable. 
Either way, the County should not be allowed to play such a 
game with an injured citizen. 
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DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. IV. 
STRICT COMPLIANCE IS REQUIRED BY 
UTAH COURTS, NOT "HYPERTECHNICALITY" 
The issue is joined. 
Plaintiff stands on her statement of this issue in her 
original Brief at page 21, point IV. 
DEFENDANT'S ISSUE NO. V 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE 
AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS ON THIS APPEAL. 
The issue is joined. 
Plaintiff stands on her statement of this issue in her 
original Brief at page 23, point V. 
The strength of Plaintiff's Argument has progressed. 
She was on somewhat thin ground in urging that there was some 
parallel in the present case and those major issues of public 
policy presented in the case she relied on, Stewart v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, 224 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (July 29, 1994) (at page 
24 of her original Brief). 
The fact that Defendant with its advantages still does 
not sguarely deal with the case facts, indicates a substantial 
justification for Plaintiff, known by the County to be severely 
injured (Exhibit 1, 3), now receiving fees and costs as an 
incentive to proper future pleadings. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that she is entitled to the relief sought in 
her original Brief on Appeal. 
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